The Gordian Knot of the Russian Question Must Be Cut
Postrussians. We found the earliest use (in 2006) of the term in the article “Are Postrussians Coming?” by Vitaly Averyanov, a Russian publicist and writer, one of the founders of the Izborsk club of Putin admirers. Of course, our approaches to the topic are opposite, but the more important are essence defining similarities. Let’s give an excerpt:
“It’s time to make an important point that eludes the understanding of anti-nationalists: skinheads and neo-Nazis with their hypertrophy of “Russianness” are in fact not a Russian people already. They represent symptoms of the incipient disintegration of the nation. Their ethnicity is akin to the ethnicity of “elves” and “goblins”, which certain percent of citizens of the Russian Federation called themselves during the census of 1992. New generations of post-Russians will be entirely radicalized, aggressive, prone to racism, ethnic isolationism and xenophobia. They are already knocking at the doors – after all, there are more and more convinced boneheads amongst teenagers, while their parents, generally, are tired of social chaos and do not condemn their beliefs. If everything continues like that, we will soon find ourselves in a country torn by ethnic strife”.
Accepted with gratitude, the term we consider extremely successful, for its author, as early as 10 years ago, described new communities, detaching from Russian masses, fastened not by decayed ethnic but ideological ties. Our opponents write that the discourse we are conducting is rather post-Soviet, but this is not so, because the main idea is that Russian people are no more.
Indeed, the term “post-Soviet” is hackneyed and is unacceptable in our context, since Soviet people, unlike Russians, exist and manifest themselves very vividly. Moreover, the Soviets which succeeded Russians as a result of the Bolshevik nation-building did become Postrussians of the first order, community, fastened precisely by supra-ethnic ties – by ideology and socialization tools that are inherent to it (schools, army, political party, etc.), by culture founded by the classic Soviet period (1930-50) and by imperial conscience. Said period buried the last, proper, Russians: anti-Soviet emigrants assimilated or got lost along with unsovetized Russians in the crucible of events.
Now, we believe we can call Russian speaking Soviets – in the complete absence of any other kinds — Russians, keeping in mind that their culture, thinking, behavior and perception are indestructibly Soviet. These people are now going their own way, trying to mold themselves into a new, pseudo-Russian[1] nation. It will be hard to achieve, because a state built upon principles of Feudalism and estates of the realm[2] is incompatible with a political nation – those are phenomena of different eras and one of them will crumble in the presence of other.
We are more interested in the innovation: Postrussains of second order – proto-identities appeared in XXI century:
1. First of all, those are Russian nationalists of the contemporary generation. For almost a few years, Russian nationalism, without ever becoming a mass movement, pupated into the “nation of nationalists”, the Ronin corporation, forever doomed to appeal to the indifferent population. The most courageous and discerning theorists of Russian nationalism came close to our conclusions. For example, Professor Pyotr Homyakov to some extent became the precursor of Postrussian discourse.
In 2014, the nationalists were divided into branches, and the terms we conventionally coined for them are Muscovites and Alternates. The first ones quickly merged with the forming “vatanation”[3] (politicized rabble), aspiring to take a leading position in it and competing in between themselves in this endeavor, while the others retained the isolation of the ronin and the status of Postrussians, remaining our friends and allies, but in some ways our opponents. Alternates found themselves in a quandary: their leaders, who possess remarkable organizational skills and who managed to preserve communities despite years of repression and the general hopelessness of affairs, have lost their theorists, the ones which are capable to catch the Zeitgeist. Homyakov died in prison in 2014, while others left to become Muscovites, some by vocation, some by obeying an order, some hoping to bridge the gap between Russian nationalism and the Soviet people on the wave of the Russian World. That’s why, at the moment, our Ronin friends continue to live with their head in the clouds, dreaming of Russian nation-state, mentally staying in the invisible city of Kitezh [4].
There are nationalists who are trying to sit on two horses simultaneously – Muscovite and Alternate, but such an attempt will end either with a choice, or a tear, or a fall.
In general, the prospects of Russian nationalism are quite dim. It is built on the chimerical perception of the ethnic reality of Russia, besides, it ruins itself by biting more than it can chew. The problems of Russian population of the RF are so profound, that the nationalists are not even able to fully grasp them, let alone approach the solution. Within the framework of a single system those are insoluble, and attempts to take on this overwhelming burden are doomed. Plagued Russian problematic should be given to Muscovites without any regrets, let them suffer.
At present, Alternate nationalists, crammed from all sides by the state, Russian protonation of “vata”, ethnic “minorities”, and abandoned by the liberals, lead the hardest rearguard battles on the scorched Russian plain, covering our crossing to the other side from it and gaining time for the branches of the Postrussian discourse to form. The most valuable asset the nationalists-Alternates have are people motivated by their identity, strikingly different from the masses, and we must preserve them, ensuring their smooth withdrawal to new frontiers.
2. Regionalists. The defective modern Russian identity and the colonial oppression of Moscow squeeze many Alternates into Ingra and Karelians, multiply regional and sub-ethnic communities, stimulate internal and external Russian escapism in a variety of forms. Presently paraethnic (actually ideological) communities of, say, Meryans or Vyatichis, are in no way connected to regionalism in the field, but this is only a consequence of the taboo on regionalism in second-rate regions of the Russian Federation (oblast’s and krai’s). The bias that Postrussian ethnics show in favor of cultural reconstructionism is largely due to both the interest in the alternative history and the security of the apolitical path. But when the conjuncture changes, they can quickly be mobilized into the regional political superstructure as carriers of alternative ideas. Many representatives of regional elites see that the Moscow mainstream is leading them to the bottom, while neither they nor representatives of the “tamed” communities (scientific, political, etc.) can often generate quality ideas and tie them to the concrete things. Apolitical ethnoreconstructors are not ready for this yet either.
The political regionalists of the provinces and regions, noted in the movement for the federalization of the regions, on the other side, are constantly on the verge of separatism charges, which can be avoided by setting a course for the creation of ethnic-cultural autonomies of Siberians, Kuban, Ingra and Meryans through the creation of new / old identities to begin polycentric ethnopolitical restructuring of Russia.
Thus, the best strategy of regionalism is the synthesis of ethnics and regionals. Remember Kipling’s fairy tale “The Beginning of the Armadillos” (there is a wonderful Soviet cartoon on the net)? The hedgehog and the turtle for protection against predators have taken the best advantages from each other, becoming armadillos, which are not afraid of any jaguar. The great example of mediation, accessible even to children.
The Kaliningrad region could become the territory of advanced development of events. BARS[5] (Baltic Vanguard of Russian Resistance, BARR) is the undisputed leader of right-wing regionalism in the Russian Federation, successfully combining Russian Alternate-nationalism with regionalism. In our opinion, BARS is the example of an excellent practical work with the region, but at the same time of being too obsessed with the past. It is possible to attract a lot of people with the old paraphernalia and second-hand greatness, but this path, favorable by many, leads to nowhere. The conflict between blood and soil, caused by regional specifics, divides the BARS between Russian nationalism and Koenigsberg. Natural regional Westernism cannot be tied to the dying Russian nationalism, this leads to a dead end. A characteristic sign of an ideological impasse in any movement is the abundance of historical pathos, enough of it we’ve seen.
Meanwhile, Koenigsberg represents a unique proving ground for the development of Postrussian discourse, and BARS has every chance of becoming its favourite. To do this, one must add a bit of ethnofuturism to the concept. The European Russian-speaking enclave in the Baltic can become the center of the national construction, attracting the Russian-speaking crowds from all Baltic republics and the Russian Federation. The creation of (relatively speaking) a Russobalt identity with Koenigsberg in the center will become a guarantee of growth and, not burdened with the weight of the Russian question, a warrantor of the integration into the European economy. It will finally let the Prussian, Germanic and Russian narratives merge into one, standing above them. In addition, the attraction of Russian-speaking residents of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to Koenigsberg, instead of Moscow, would remove the significant internal problems of the Baltic region.
3. Discoursive Postrussian identities. Difficulties of their formation lie primarily in the diffuse network nature of ideological communities, which still does not allow the achievement of a noticeable concentration of like-minded people offline. Perhaps an effective strategy for them will be partial devirtualization and access to local communities of Alternates with subsequent work in the vein of regionalism. In the case of new “parade of sovereignties”, local unprincipled elites, amorphous hooray-patriots with a touch of reddish-brown and bandits will seize the power in the regions. If the parade will transform into Disastroyka, such governance will be swept away. Vladimir Pastukhov writes: “The well-known old type of the ideological Russian fanatic will replace the unprincipled and businesslike “New Russian”. The hard pressure of the criminal element should be opposed by a no less rigorous but non-materially motivated adherence to the principles. Russia is preparing for the arrival of a new hero, one of those that “despised halfpenny comfort[6]” who is ready to face the bullet for the idea, not for winning the tender. Those people continue to live in the cultural underground and are waiting in the wings.
Therefore, the current task of the Postrussian communities is to grow themselves into the regions, build up links and strengthen connections, preserve communication options on the Internet and beyond. In addition, it is important to realize the impossibility (and uselessness) of spreading their dissystematic ideas throughout Russia. The experience of 1917 is unique. Operational planning should initially focus on the territory of the scale of the DPR/LPR with a possible direction of development towards the creation of analogues of the “red belt” of the 1990s. Of course, this is only about ideological influence, nothing else.
In general, we believe that regionalism is the most promising branch of the development of Postrussian discourse at the moment. The theoretical base we have outlined needs to be developed and particularized in the field. The construction of the regional identity is a large-scale and responsible endeavor. In fact, this is a nation-building in miniature. There is a need for an interpretation of history and ethnography well-grounded in a concrete region, for clear and attractive terms and names, for a wise policy in relations with other actors, and much more. But we have no other choice if we don’t want to walk around a circle again, like a circus horse. The Gordian knot of the Russian question must be cut.
Dmitry Altufiev,
editor-in-chief of the magazine “Ostrog”, especially for the official website of BARS.
2016
Translated by M. Kulikov
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[1] There is a subtlety here, hard to translate. As a common knowledge to political scientists specializing in Russia, there is a strict distinction between words русский (russkiy) and российский (rossiyskiy) which both translate into “Russian”. The difference is that the first word is tied to ethnicity and the second – to the state and a government, hence two wholly different meanings. The meaning used here is the second one.
[2] Sosloveism.
[3] This loose term is derived from the jargon word vata, which is popular in everyday and informal political discourse. Vata is in turn a derivative from vatnik which directly translates into quilted (or padded with wadding) jacket that symbolizes the most marginalized and uncultured segments of the population, lumpen so to speak.
[4] Kitezh (Russian: Китеж) is a legendary messianic city beneath the waters of Lake Svetloyar in central Russia. Reference to Kitezh appears for the first time in "Kitezh Chronicle", an anonymous book from the late 18th century, believed to have originated among the Old Believers. According to the legend, only those who are pure in their heart and soul will find their way to Kitezh.
[5] While BARS may sound ironic in English, when pronouncing it in Russian as “барс” it translates as a snow leopard.
[6] Quotation from a popular song “Brigantine” by a well-known Soviet bard and poet Yuri Vizbor.