Космическая политика Индии
За последние годы космическая политика Индии претерпела кардинальную трансформацию, перейдя от модели государственного развития к амбициозной коммерческой стратегии. Этот сдвиг направлен на превращение страны в одного из ведущих игроков на мировой космической арене. Такая активная работа индийских властей в сфере космоса направлена на обеспечение национальной безопасности, стимулирование экономического роста и укрепление влияния на мировой арене. Основой этих целей служит концепция стратегической автономии и технологической самодостаточности (Atmanirbhar Bharat). Правительство ставит задачу увеличить долю страны в мировой космической экономике с 2% до 8% (с $8,4 млрд до $44 млрд) к 2033 году, для чего планируется инвестировать $22 млрд и создать венчурный фонд для поддержки около 40 стартапов.
Обзор космической политики своей страны подготовил наш индийский коллега Рави Радж (Ravi Raj). Публикуем комментарий на английском языке.
India's space policy has undergone a significant paradigm shift over the past few years, moving from a developmental policy previously dominated by the Government of India to an ambitious, commercial space policy, making India a strong contender to become a leading space power. There are three broad goals outlined in government policy and strategic documents to bolster national security, support economic development, and enhance India's role in the international order. The vision of strategic autonomy, which translates into technological self-reliance in the civilian and military arenas, is the foundation of these goals and part of the larger national goal of Atmanirbhar Bharat, or self-reliant India.
This policy is both ambitious and cost-effective. India is currently about 2 per cent of the space economy, with a value of around USD 8.4 billion in 2022. The government aims to increase this to USD 44 billion by 2033, accounting for 8 per cent of the world's market, of which USD 11 billion would be exported. USD 22 billion is envisioned to be invested over the next decade to achieve this goal, covering activities across the upstream (launch systems, satellite manufacturing), midstream (ground operations), and downstream (Earth observation, navigation, satellite communications) sectors. The government also approved a special Rs. In October 2024, a 1,000 crore Venture Capital Fund (VCF) was established under IN-SPACe to address the risk capital gap, a concern for private investments in the space sector, and to support nearly 40 space startups at various growth stages for a period of five years.
The Indian Space Policy of 2023, India's first comprehensive national policy document in space, is at the very core of this economic liberalisation. Before this, all space activities were state-controlled and focused on the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). For the first time, the policy in 2023 also introduced a definition of Non-Governmental Entities, enabling private companies to undertake space activities end-to-end without being limited to serving as vendors for governmental initiatives. The transition from a planned economy model to a competitive market-oriented model is akin to the liberalisation that has benefited the Indian IT industry and is likely to fuel job creation and innovation.
The institutional framework of this change has multiple interlocking bodies. The Department of Space, which falls within the Prime Minister's Office, holds an important position and enjoys overall authority over the budget, as the incumbent prime minister has a personal institutional interest. ISRO, the lead civil space agency, is now being redirected towards flagship national programmes and not anything else as a space agency. IN-SPACe (Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre) was set up in 2020 and has its headquarters in Ahmedabad. It has regulatory powers and is also a trade promotion organisation, which some have suggested can lead to conflict between its regulatory and promotional roles. ISRO's key industrial
programmes, such as the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV), are implemented by a commercial spin-off of ISRO, NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), while Antrix Corporation Limited continues to market ISRO technologies abroad.
India's civilian space programme rests on a series of ever more daring space missions. The Chandrayaan-3 mission, launched in August 2023, took India to the Moon's south pole for the first time in its history, establishing it as a proud nation. In the future, ISRO plans to launch its first human spaceflight mission, Gaganyaan, in 2027. In 2028, two missions – a Venus orbiter and the return of lunar samples on Chandrayaan-4 – are scheduled, followed by the deployment of the permanently manned Bharatiya Antariksh Station (BAS) by 2035 and a crewed lunar landing under the Vision 2040 initiative. For India, these missions are not only scientific endeavours but also symbolic expressions of technological progress and the aspiration to become a great power, especially given the country's colonial past and its attempts to assert itself as a contender for that role.
As far as security is concerned, India's space policy has been significantly affected by its competition with China in the region. The Chinese anti-satellite test of 2007 was pivotal, which led India to launch its own counter-space measures. Mission Shakti was an anti-satellite test carried out by India in March 2019. It was the fourth such successful test, after the first three conducted by the United States, Russia, and China. Defence Space Agency, a tri-service agency established in 2019, and India's first joint military space exercise (IndSpaceEx) in the same year, clearly indicate a systematic attempt to embed space into the country's national security architecture. The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement with the United States, concluded following the 2020 border clashes with China, further hastened this process and highlighted India's shortcomings in military Earth observation and reconnaissance. In 2025, amid renewed tensions with Pakistan, India announced plans to rapidly expand its Space-Based Surveillance programme, which will include 52 defence and surveillance satellites by 2029.
International collaborations in India are not value-based but interest-based. The United States has become the most geopolitically relevant player, especially under the TRUST initiative (Transforming the Relationship Utilising Strategic Technology), intelligence and information exchange, and the growing commercial relationship driven by the Indian community in the United States technology sector. Historically, France has played an important role in technology transfer, and France is considered one of the few Western countries with a sincere attitude towards India as an equal partner. ESA and ISRO are currently working together on key missions, including the joint infrared satellite TRISHNA. In May 2025, they agreed to take a first step towards interoperability in rendezvous and docking systems, laying the groundwork for potential future Indian-European cooperation on the planned BAS space station after the end of the International Space Station (ISS) around 2030. Japan is considered an important contributor to high technology, especially for the Chandrayaan lunar mission and the upcoming LUPEX
mission. Historically, India's closest partner in space, but Russia's capabilities have diminished, and geopolitical shifts have turned it into a largely symbolic counterpart.
India has aimed to expand its space programme as a tool of soft power at the regional level, with the launch of the South Asia Satellite (GSAT-9) in 2017, which was offered as a gift to the neighbouring South Asian countries, except Pakistan. The project was a symbolic gesture, giving India a different way to project itself as a benevolent regional power and an alternative to the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) championed by China. Still, results have been limited, and the execution of planned ground infrastructure in partner countries has been slow. In general, India's regional space diplomacy features bilateral formats and unilateral service delivery over institutionalised multilateral formats, reflecting the broader foreign policy inclination.
India is also pursuing a space governance agenda aimed at establishing binding multilateral rules to limit the capacity of existing space powers to secure irreversible benefits for themselves. India is also playing the Global South in space governance by promoting the agenda of binding multilateral rules that would restrict the capacity of established space powers to secure irreversible advantages. It is actively engaged in the work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and actively supports a wide range of international legal instruments concerning outer space. But real conflicts arise between this multilateralist rhetoric and India's actions, most notably in the 2019 anti-satellite test, which contravened its promise of the peaceful use of space. India's decision to join the US-led Artemis Accords for the first time, without having been one of the drafters, shows that sideshows sometimes overcame India's own multilateral instincts in shaping strategic calculations with the United States.
The collection as a whole suggests a space programme in a genuine turning point, more well-funded and institutionally ambitious than ever before, freer of technology limitations than ever before, more commercially diverse than ever before and more reliant on foreign supply chains than ever before, but also more affected by competing objectives of self-reliance and international partnerships than ever before. The success of converting these lofty numeric aspirations – from two to eight per cent of the global space economy – into reality rests heavily on the maturing of the private sector, the efficiency of the institutions newly set up – such as IN-SPACe – and on India's capacity to draw in foreign investment and technology partnerships, which its own domestic space economy cannot yet match.